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Themes and Topics in Parliamentary Oversight Hearings:
A New Direction in Textual Data Analysis
James Sanders, Giulio Lisi, and Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
London School of Economics
Abstract
This paper contributes to the growing empirical work on deliberation in legisla-
tures by proposing a novel approach to analysing parliamentary hearings using both
thematic and topic modelling textual analysis software. We explore variations in delib-
erative quality across economic policy type (fiscal policy, monetary policy and financial
stability) and across parliamentary chambers (Commons and Lords) in UK select com-
mittee oversight hearings during the 2010-2015 Parliament. Our overall focus is not
only to suggest a multi-method approach to the textual analysis of parliamentary data,
but also to explore more substantive aspects of parliamentary oversight, such as: (1)
the extent to which oversight varies between unelected and elected policy makers; and
(2) whether parliamentarians conduct oversight more forcefully or more along partisan
lines when they are challenging fellow politicians as opposed to central bank officials.
Our findings suggest consistent differences in deliberative styles between types of hear-
ings (fiscal, monetary, financial stability) and between chambers (Commons, Lords).
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1 Introduction
We pursue two broad goals in this paper. First, we seek to better understand the form
and quality of deliberation in UK parliamentary select committee hearings on economic
policy oversight. Inasmuch as these hearings are a key venue for public accountability,
they entail a reciprocal dialogue between parliamentarians and both central bankers and
Treasury ministers. The latter are under a statutory obligation to provide explanations for
objectives held and decisions taken, and in this context, the central purpose of the hearings
is deliberation. Notably, this “discussion phase” of accountability has received very little
empirical investigation (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012), with even less given to the actual
verbatim content of these hearings. By gauging the content of these hearings, this paper
further contributes to the growing empirical work on deliberation by focusing on oversight
of monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy in both the upper and lower houses
of Parliament. Whereas the Treasury Select Committee (TSC) in the House of Commons
has sole statutory authority to scrutinise both the Bank of England and the Treasury, the
Lords Economic Affairs Committee (EAC) also exercises its own power to hold hearings
with these two groups. Hence, studying deliberation in both the TSC and the EAC allows
us to vary the deliberative setting to include (1) an elected body (the TSC) questioning
both unelected officials from the Bank and elected ministers from the Treasury; and (2) an
unelected body (the EAC) similarly questioning both unelected and elected witnesses.
These variations in the deliberative setting enable our investigation of two distinct in-
dicators of deliberative quality in oversight hearings: (1) reciprocal dialogue, and (2) non-
(or cross-) partisanship, which we explain in our next section. In brief, we assert that effec-
tive discussion in oversight hearings should exhibit dialogue in which committee members
ask policy-relevant questions, and witnesses provide answers to these same questions (i.e.,
their responses are not diversionary). Moreover, to be effective, the exchanges should re-
late to policy processes and outcomes, rather than exhibit overt partisanship or political
point-scoring. The approach taken here is broadly exploratory, but our two indicators of
deliberative quality in oversight hearings provide the basis upon which we assess the content
of these hearings.
Reliance on textual analysis software is not without its pitfalls, as some have noted
(Grimmer and Stewart 2013). As our second broad goal, we bring together two approaches
to automated content analysis – thematic and topic modelling – which previously had little
in common (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, Illia et al. 2014). We demonstrate that while these
approaches have different assumptions, algorithms and forms of output, there is nonetheless
a common foundation upon which to deepen our understanding of the text under investiga-
tion, and using this foundation, there is opportunity to expand the toolkit for automated
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textual analysis. In short, we argue that by conducting multiple automated content analyses
on the same corpus we offer a more comprehensive empirical examination of both aspects of
quality of deliberation in oversight hearings (i.e., reciprocity and non-partisanship). More-
over, in this process, we outline more clearly the commonalities and differences between
“themes” and “topics” in political texts.
2 Measuring Deliberation in Parliament
While the conceptual underpinnings of accountability vary, there is broad agreement that
at its core, accountability “involves an obligation to explain and justify one’s past conduct”
(Brandsma and Schillemans 2012, pg. 966), and critical to this is a discussion phase in which
questions may be raised and actors are given the opportunity to provide reasons for their
decisions and policy actions. Whereas existing quantitative assessments of accountability
do not generally focus on this discussion stage (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012, pg. 957),
scholars of deliberative democracy offer a foundation for studying deliberative discourse
(Bachtiger et al. 2010), with its focus on reasoned argument. Measuring empirically the
existence, the extent and the quality of such reasoned argument in real world settings
nonetheless remains a formidable task. Recent studies have sought to gain traction on
the empirics of deliberation by isolating and then measuring one or two critical dimensions
(e.g., “information” (Mucciaroni and Quirk 2006); or “open-mindedness” (Barabas 2004)).
We adopt this same stance on deliberation, but with the intent being to measure what is
arguably the core feature of monetary and fiscal policy accountability–that is, the provision
of explanations for objectives held and decisions taken. Specifically, legislators are expected
to challenge Bank and Treasury officials and ministers on their policy decisions and these
individuals are, in turn, expected to provide reasons for their decisions. Effective deliberation
between politicians and both unelected officials and elected ministers who are being held
to account is thus one of engagement and reciprocity (i.e., participants talk to one another
and take up others’ points).
Previous empirical studies of deliberation in legislatures have typically analysed floor
debates, with legislators deliberating the merits of legislation (Steiner et al. 2004, Quirk and
Binder 2005, Mucciaroni and Quirk 2006, Bachtiger and Hangartner 2010). In contrast, in
this paper (a) the focus is on the varying dialogues between elected legislators and unelected
officials and elected ministers; (b) the deliberation itself occurs in committees; and (c)
the purpose is to hold both the Bank of England and the Treasury to account, thereby
providing a link between economic policy decision making and the will of the voting public.
This study thus constitutes a specific type of legislative deliberation. The approach here
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is also novel in that it does not examine the ex-ante controls that legislators might seek
to devise over agencies (i.e., as in principal agent theories (Bawn 1995, Huber and Shipan
2000, 2002), but rather focuses on economic policy hearings. These hearings are an ex-post
form of oversight and as such are less well understood by political scientists (McGrath 2013,
pg. 349), or when examined, are done so in terms of the number of hearings rather than their
substantive content (Feinstein 2014).This study focuses on a specific form of deliberation in
committees with legislators and witnesses from both the central bank and Treasury, where
the accountability of the latter requires a critical and robust exchange of views between the
two sets of participants. And, to be effective, the reciprocal dialogue must entail a critical
review across all relevant issues of the decisions of the witnesses giving testimony.
Our second empirical indicator of effective deliberation in oversight hearings is that ex-
changes between questioners and witnesses should relate to policy processes and outcomes,
rather than exhibit overt partisanship or political point-scoring. Importantly, parliamentary
reforms in 2010 stripped power away from party whips to appoint select committee mem-
bers and instead created elections for both members and committee chairs, which then gave
committees more autonomy to hold Government to account (UK Parliament 2013). These
reforms have further embedded the expectation that select committees should endeavour
to conduct scrutiny in a nonpartisan manner – that is, they “might exercise their parlia-
mentary, rather than party, muscles by engaging in scrutiny activity geared towards better
holding government to account”’ (Keslo 2012, pg. 5). Indeed, Andrew Tyrie, Chairman of
the TSC, argues in his 2015 book that “Select Committees are now much more effective
scrutineers and investigators than they were even five years ago” (Tyrie 2015, pg. 34), but
can this more effective oversight be said to apply across all policy areas, particularly in
terms of fostering the nonpartisan ethos? This study addresses this question by examining
the verbatim transcripts from the hearings of the Treasury Committee and the hearings of
the Economic Affairs Committee on monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy, for
the whole of the 2010-15 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government. Textual
analysis software is employed to analyse these data in their entirety.
3 Select Committees
3.1 Treasury Select Committee and Economic Affairs Committee
Elsewhere the broader context for the study of UK Select Committee hearings is discussed in
depth (Schonhardt-Bailey 2015). Nonetheless some brief context is required for the hearings
on economic policy oversight by both the Commons’ Treasury Select Committee and the
Lords’ Economic Affairs Committee for the 2010-15 Parliament.
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The Treasury Select Committee (TSC) is responsible for overseeing the spending, policies
and administration of both the Treasury and the Bank of England. Scrutiny of the Trea-
sury is most conspicuous in the form of an inquiry into the Budget statement. Following
each spring’s Budget statement, the committee gathers evidence from witnesses (including
the Chancellor of the Exchequer) on the Government’s proposals, and then publishes its
recommendations and conclusions. In turn, the Government responds to the committee’s
findings, often incorporating information from the Office for Budget Responsibility.
Similar to other independent central banks, the Bank of England is subject to formal
legislative oversight. The objective of UK monetary policy is laid down in the 1998 Bank of
England Act, where the stated priority is price stability and “subject to that”, the legislation
mandates the Bank to support the Government’s policies for growth and employment. The
Bank pursues an inflation target (currently 2%) which is set by the government. The Bank is
independent with respect to the instruments chosen (usually by varying a short-term interest
rate, but also by so-called quantitative easing via asset purchases) to achieve the objective
of low inflation, without interference from political actors. The Bank’s Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) is tasked with formulating monetary policy decisions. With respect to
financial stability, financial services reforms of 2012/13 created the Bank’s Financial Policy
Committee (FPC), which has statutory responsibility for financial stability by lessening the
scope for systemic risks and preventing the likelihood of future financial crises (or reducing
their impact).
The Treasury Select Committee conducts hearings with representatives from the Bank’s
MPC1 and FPC on their policy decisions. In contrast to fiscal policy, the Treasury committee
does not produce a subsequent report following these monetary policy and financial stability
oversight hearings.
Committees in the House of Lords operate quite differently from those in the House
of Commons, and by all accounts, are less partisan in nature. Most importantly, Lords
committees do not scrutinise government departments in the way that Commons committees
do. Instead, Lords committees are more thematically constructed, focusing on four main
areas–economics, Europe, science and the UK constitution. And, because individuals can
become peers based on years of experience and excellence in their fields, committees in the
upper house often exploit this experience and expertise in the composition of committee
memberships. Whereas since 2010, members in Commons committees are elected by party
groups and chairs are elected in a secret ballot by the whole chamber (as noted above),
members of committees in the Lords are appointed by more traditional means–namely, via
the whips. Furthermore, and in contrast with the Commons–crossbenchers in the Lords
lessen the scope for partisan clashes, as does the absence of electoral motivations. Other
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features of the Lords committees include their reputation for investigating issues that are
both “more strategic” and “more technical”–thereby reflecting the experience and expertise
of their members (Russell 2013, pg. 210). In a recent comparison of Commons and Lords
committees, Russell has described the latter as “less adversarial” in hearings with experts
(Russell 2013, pg. 211).
The Economic Affairs Committee (EAC) is responsible for reviewing economic affairs–
which, broadly defined, may range from tax avoidance to the economic ramifications of shale
gas. The EAC conducts occasional hearings, some of which contribute to formal reports and
others are meant as information gathering exercises. Of significance is that the EAC is a
relatively new committee, growing from ad hoc status in 1998 (to monitor the new MPC, as
the Blair-Brown Labour Government made the Bank independent) to permanency in 2001.
In sum, while both the Commons and Lords committees conduct hearing covering as-
pects of monetary policy, fiscal policy and financial stability, there are many important
unique characteristics of each committee. As our focus is on deliberative quality in over-
sight hearings, we seek to assess these two committees according to our criteria of reciprocity
and partisanship, by examining empirically the verbatim transcripts of these hearings.
4 Our Methodological Approach
We identify and explore two broad approaches to automated textual analysis, each with
different assumptions as to the context in which words appear in a text. The first approach–
which we call “thematic” (and elsewhere is referred to as keyword-in-context, or KWIC [Illia
et al. (2014)])–assumes that speakers of textual data convey meaning in a distinctly thematic
fashion, so that it is not just the words that help to classify content but also the context
in which the words appear. Thematic approaches to textual data are particularly effective
in settings in which the form of argumentation or deliberation is of research interest, as it
allows one to capture the sequencing, reciprocal and interactive nature of the argumentative
structure. In the pre-processing stage, words are reduced to their lemmas and aspects of
the text such a punctuation are retained in order to identify how words appear together in
a section of text. Software using this approach employs co-occurrence analysis to examine
the bivariate associations between words and phrases in order to map out concept clouds
(specifically, the existence of words and phrases that tend to co-occur), and the relationships
between concept clouds within a single corpus. A common feature of these approaches is to
cluster textual units according to their semantic similarity. Such classifications are normally
achieved by finding a partition of classes that maximises variation in the vocabulary across
the different groupings.2 The interpretation of the clusters obtained proceeds by analysing
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the occurrences of particular terms in any given class. Besides this, thematic approaches
also rely upon multiple spatial representations of the associations (correspondence analysis,
dendrograms [or distance trees]) to capture relationships between themes in the corpus and
independent variables which identify unique characteristics of the authors of the text (names,
party affiliation, role, etc) and the setting (speech, hearing, date, place).
A second approach to automated content analysis is topic modelling. Topic models (Blei
and Lafferty 2006, 2009) have been employed to capture the content of political texts (Grim-
mer 2010, Quinn et al. 2010, Proksch and Slapin 2014), where the task is to automatically
classify the contents of documents into “topics”. These models do not conceptualise the
text under investigation as inherently argumentative or deliberative–and particularly not in
a way that would require a reciprocal and interactive mode of communication among the par-
ticipants. Rather, these models conceptualise the textual data more as what (Goodin 2000)
describes as “notice posting”–that is, more as a one-way flow of communication. Instead of
lemmatisation, applications of these models normally simplify the vocabulary by reducing
words to a single root (“stemming”)–where, for example, institution, institutions, institu-
tional might all conform to institution.3 As one review of this approach notes (Grimmer and
Stewart 2013, pg. 272), stemming is a “crude” but “faster” form of “lemmatisation”, with
the latter employing word and sentence context (including punctuation) and dictionaries for
a richer, more nuanced mapping of the text. Unlike thematic analyses, topic models em-
ploy a probabilistic approach whereby topics represent joint probability distributions over
documents and words.
We maintain that a thematic approach to analysing textual data is, prima facie, the pre-
ferred methodology for a study of deliberation. A thematic approach allows the researcher to
capture and measure the sequencing of argument and moreover, how others respond to the
particular arguments made. Because deliberation requires reasoned argument, any approach
that fails to capture how arguments develop and the extent to which others respond (or not)
to a form of argumentation, is inherently missing the key component of deliberation. This
is not to say, however, that an alternative approach like topic modelling is entirely inappro-
priate for studying deliberation. Topic models enable one to capture the underlying content
of the deliberation, which is of fundamental importance. Indeed, knowing the content of the
deliberation is a precursor to understanding how the arguments implicit within that con-
tent develop as a sequence over time and how others respond to the reasons given in these
arguments. We therefore begin with a thematic approach by default, but then use topic
modelling as a means to extend the analysis to lend new insights into our understanding of
the content of the discourse and how that content varies over a set of covariates.
In both cases, our key task in examining the parliamentary oversight hearings is to
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ascertain the extent to which witnesses are effectively held to account. Do they answer the
questions asked? Is the dialogue reciprocal or diversionary? Are parliamentarians more
interested in making partisan jabs than in uncovering and understanding the reasons for
decisions made and actions taken?
4.1 Data
As outlined above, the Treasury Select Committee holds regular hearings with MPC mem-
bers on the Bank of England’s Quarterly Inflation Report;4 with FPC members of the Bank
on the Financial Stability Report;5 and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the gov-
ernment’s budget. In contrast, the hearings of the Economic Affairs Committee are less
frequent for both monetary and fiscal policy, and for the period of this study it held no
hearings on the Financial Stability Report.6 Appendix A lists the hearings included for
each committee for the 2010-15 Conservative-Liberal Democratic Government: in total,
thirty for the TSC (sixteen on monetary policy, seven on financial stability, and seven on
fiscal policy), and seven for the EAC (four for monetary and three for fiscal policy). Further
appendices in Schonhardt-Bailey (2015) provide details of the committee memberships and
partisan affiliations, and a full list of witnesses who gave oral evidence in each committee
hearing, along with the committee members appearing for each hearing.
The data are initially structured into five text files, comprised of the above hearings
for each committee–that is, each committee’s hearings on economic policy are separated
into those covering monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy. The text files
are structured so that each speech or remark constitutes a “case”, and each is identified
with identifying characteristics (or “tagged covariates”)–the name of the speaker, his or her
party affiliation (including “crossbenchers” for the Lords and “no party” for central bank
officials and Treasury witnesses), the speaker’s role (committee chair, committee member,
MPC internal member, MPC external member, Chancellor, Treasury staff), and the date
of the hearing.We analyse each of these independently using the software Alceste, forming
thematic classes using the words contained only in a given hearing. We then compare
the results obtained with those from an additional proprietary software, T-Lab, which we
apply on an identical dataset. We add to the results from T-Lab and Alceste those derived
from fitting a Structural Topic Model (STM) (Roberts, Stewart, Tingley et al. (2014)),
implemented using the stm package in R (Roberts, Stewart and Tingley 2014) to a dataset
which combines the five corpora into a single collection.In the remaining part of this section,
we briefly outline the algorithm employed by each software, followed by a comparison of the
classes and topics formed in each case.
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5 Cluster Matching
The Treasury Select Committee (TSC) and the Economic Affairs Committee (EAC) hold
hearings based on a variety of policy areas. As such, we can neatly segregate the data into
five distinct corpora as follows: TSC Monetary Policy, TSC Financial Stability, TSC Fiscal
Policy, EAC Monetary Policy, and EAC Fiscal Policy. In this section we analyse each of these
independently using the software Alceste, forming classes using the words contained only
in a given hearing. We then compare the results obtained with those from an additional
thematic software, T-Lab, which we apply on an identical dataset. Finally, we compare
results obtained with T-Lab and Alceste with those derived from fitting a Structural Topic
Model (STM) to a dataset which combines the five corpora into a single collection.
The reason we compare the clusters formed by these three approaches is that if there
were disagreements regarding the substantive content of these debates, we could not take
full advantage of the unique tools available to us in each software because each would be
considering disparate concepts–that is, we could not study reciprocity and partisanship on
the same policy dimension if it only appeared in one set of results.
In the remaining part of this section, we briefly outline the algorithm employed by each
software, followed by an explanation of the procedure used for the comparison of the classes
and topics formed in each case.
5.1 Alceste
Alceste is a thematic analysis software, meaning it considers co-occurrences across lexical
units (key words) to form stable classes that are representative of the text. The software
proceeds by identifying a set of ‘gauged sentences’ (or Elementary Context Units, ECUs),
from a pre-existing division of the text specified by the user (Schonhardt-Bailey 2005).
This constitutes the sampling unit of the analysis. In our case, it is represented by single
interventions in committee hearings.
Using the occurrence of words in each ECU, Alceste builds the classification using a
iterative descending hierarchical classification algorithm which decomposes the classes until
a predetermined number of iterations fails to result in further significant divisions (Reinert
1998). More specifically, it operates upon the corpus as follows:
1. Parsing of the vocabulary.
2. Transforming the corpus into a sequence of Elementary Context Units (ECUs) con-
taining lemmas and operates a descending classification which produce stable classes
of these ECUs, leaving what does not fit in these classes remain unclassified. In prac-
tice, this classification proceeds iteratively with the software identifying, at each step,
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the partition that maximises the distances between classes. Such distances are given
by the χ2 values of the words used in each class.
3. It forms a contingency table of lemmas by stable classes and calculates the χ2 and φ
coefficients for each intersection to characterise the most characteristic lemmas from
their associations with each cluster.
4. The lexical world is free to be interpreted by the operator.
Step 4 –class interpretation and labelling– is the most important for substantive inter-
pretation. It requires the researcher to apply semantic meaning to a list of characteristic
lemmas and ECUs ordered by their φ and χ2 values. This involves first looking at the list
of the most representative words for each semantic class and, second, analysing the ECUs
most strongly associated with each class. The labelling process is repeated for each class,
until the user has assigned a label to all lists – after which, more complex analyses (i.e.
dendrograms, correspondence analysis etc.) can begin. This process was applied to each of
our five corpora individually. The results of the labelling process are displayed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Alceste Class Labels
Corpus Label
TSC MP Bank of England Lending Facilities
TSC MP Real Economy, Productivity & Competitiveness
TSC MP Monetary Policy Decisions & Decision Making Process
TSC MP Inflation Forecast & Outlook for Inflation
TSC MP Forward Guidance & Outlook for Monetary Policy
TSC FP Tax and Benefits
TSC FP Budget Process and Role of Ministers
TSC FP Budget Leaks
TSC FP Economic Effects of Budget
TSC FP Public Deficit and Debt
TSC FS Bank Capital, Leverage & Lending Capacity
TSC FS Housing & Household Indebtedness
TSC FS Governance of the Bank of England
TSC FS Barclays and LIBOR
EAC MP Pensions, Savings & Annuities
EAC MP Real Economy & Economic Forecasts
EAC MP Financial Stability & Macro Prudential Policy
EAC MP Banking & Bank Regulation
EAC MP Too Big to Fail & Bank Resolution
EAC MP Stress Testing Banks & Bank Lending
EAC FP Energy, Energy Prices, Gas & Shale Oil
EAC FP Real Economy & Bank Lending
EAC FP Financial Services & Regulation
EAC FP Scotland & Regions
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5.2 T-Lab
Similar to Alceste, T-Lab employs a thematic approach to classification, considering co-
occurrences between lexical units. As well as being algorithmically independent, T-Lab also
offers more opportunities to tailor its methods to the particular research question and data.
As such, this brief description of methods will also justify any methodological or algorithmic
decisions.
To normalise the data before clustering, T-Lab utilises the tf-idf (Salton 1989) measure
and the Euclidean norm. Then, the software can conduct a supervised (top-down) classifi-
cation, unsupervised (bottom-up) classification or a mixture of both. We choose the latter
by using an unsupervised classification method and then refining these results using a super-
vised method. The researcher is provided two variants for seeding the algorithms: bisecting
K-means, or PDDP and K-means. The two methods vary by how the seeds of each bisection
are calculated. A bisecting k-means analysis gains its seeds for each bisection through an
iterative algorithm. In the PDDP (Principal Direction Divisive Partitioning) and K-means
method, the seeds are computed through a Singular Value Decomposition (Boley 1998).
Once the seeds have been selected they are then used for each K-means bisection, much
like the first method (Lancia 2017). As for deciding the most appropriate seeding to use,
Savaresi and Boley (2004) compared the two methods and concluded “the best compro-
mise between computational effort and cluster quality is to use K-means initialised with the
PDDP result”. Hence, to obtain the best results with the computational resources available,
in this thematic analysis we run an unsupervised clustering using the PDDP and K-means
process.
Once the initial clusters have been calculated, T-Lab gives the option to refine the
results of the obtained partition. The first variant is a Naive Bayes Classifier, which allows
the analyst to remove from the analysis all context units that do not pass a given criteria. A
second method to refine the partition is offered by a reclassification based on typical words,
which performs a supervised classification by considering the characteristic lemmas as items
of a category dictionary. This second method is more selective and hence tends to harbour
a lower ECU classification rate. Despite this, we select this refining method because: (1)
the loss of elementary contexts is only marginally greater than the alternative; and (2) it
arguably offers a more precise and rigorous classification.
Once the partitions have been refined,7 χ2 coefficients are calculated at each intersection
of the cluster by lemma contingency table. The researcher then assigns meaning to each
class in a similar way to that in section 5.1. The final labels are displayed in Table 2.
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Table 2: T-Lab Class Labels
Corpus Label
TSC MP Outlook for inflation and Inflation Expectations
TSC MP Bank Lending to SMEs
TSC MP Scotland and Foreign Exchange Reserves
TSC MP Real Economy and House Price Growth
TSC MP Quantitative Easing Discussions
TSC FP Housing Benefit
TSC FP Fiscal Deficit and Government Debt
TSC FP Ministerial/Cabinet Involvement in the Budget Process
TSC FP Income Tax Rates
TSC FP Bank Lending to SMEs
TSC FS Bank Stress Tests, Mortgage Lending and House Prices
TSC FS Bank of England Governance and FPC/MPC
TSC FS LIBOR
TSC FS Parliament and Govt Roles in respect of FPC/PRA
EAC MP Inflation Outlook and the Economy
EAC MP Bank Capital and Lending
EAC MP Scottish Referendum
EAC MP Leverage Ratio for Banks
EAC MP QE and Pension Investment
EAC MP Bank Policy Committee Decision Making
EAC FP Tax Measures (Notably Energy)
EAC FP Financial Crisis/International Debt Problems (especially Ireland)
EAC FP EU/Financial Services/Regulation
EAC FP Scotland
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5.3 Structural Topic Model
Our final method is the structural topic model (STM) proposed by Roberts, Stewart, Tingley
et al. (2014). STM builds upon previous topic models, including the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al. 2003) and Correlated Topic Model (CTM) (Blei and Lafferty
2007). Similar to LDA, the STM is a generative model of the text: its algorithm defines
a data-generating process for each document and then word frequencies observed within
documents are used to find the most likely values for the model parameters.
Topic models assume the text to be generated by a fixed number of topics K, each
representing joint probability distributions over documents and words. A single topic is
defined as a probability distribution over the vocabulary, where each word has a probability
of belonging to a given topic. A document is itself a mixture of topics – that is, a single
document can be composed of multiple different topics depending on its constituent words.
More specifically, topical content refers to the probability that a given word from the vocab-
ulary can be found within a document, whilst topical prevalences refer to the probability
a particular document belongs to a topic. Topic content is used for identifying the hidden
semantic structures within the documents, while topic prevalences are used for analysing
the occurrence of a given semantic class within a particular document.
The key innovation of the STM is the inclusion of document level meta-data (covariates)
into the analysis. In each case, each document (in our case each intervention in the hearing)
is assigned a list of covariates (i.e. chamber, party, etc). This feature of the model, and
related plotting functions in the stm package used to fit the algorithm, allows the user to
examine the relationships between topics and document level covariates to gain a deeper
understanding of the text. In particular, it allows the researcher to condition the analysis
of topic prevalence across the set of covariates. We will refer to this particular feature of
STM in a subsequent section.
As other topic models, STM requires the number of topics to be fixed in advance by the
researcher. This normally involves a trade-off between model fitting and information pro-
vided (Grimmer and Stewart 2013), as K must be large enough to produce distinct semantic
classes but small enough to be useful for the analysis (Quinn et al. 2010). Our selection
method proceeds in two steps. First, we compare model performance by analysing the held
out likelihood values, a measure of model fit for topic models,8 for STM fits with a number
of topics ranging from 5 to 80. This procedure indicates that a K in the neighbourhood
of 25-40 provides a reasonable fit of the data.9 Second, we analyse the topical content of
models in this particular range to understand which one provides the most interpretable
results. By so doing, we select a model with K = 30 topics,10 which we use for the analysis
presented in the next section.
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The resulting labels are reported in Table 3; these are obtained by analysing the topical
content for each semantic class identified by the algorithm, a process which is analogous to
that carried out for Alceste and T-Lab. Further details about model selection, in particular
concerning the choice of the number of topics adopted, are described in Appendix B.
Table 3: STM Topic Labels
Topic # Label
1 Labour Market/Economic Growth
2 Bank Lending to SMEs
3 Policy Discussion/Form of Policy
4 LIBOR
5 Real Economy/Investment
6 Path of Expected Inflation
7 Housing Market/New Home Building
8 Quantitative Easing
9 Policy Discussion
10 FPC/Household Debt
11 Transmission of Policy to the Economy
12 European Union
13 Policy Discussion
14 Accountability to the TSC
15 Rebalancing of Debt and Imbalances
16 Borrowing Costs/Transmission of Monetary Policy
17 FPC/Bank Capital and Stress Tests
18 Policy Discussion
19 Eurozone/Global Risks to the UK
20 Scotland
21 Monetary & Fiscal Policy Mix
22 Policy Discussion
23 Bank of England Governance/Oversight Committee
24 Fiscal Outlook
25 (Reform of) Bank Regulation
26 (Reform of) Bank Capital
27 Fiscal Policy/Tax and Benefits
28 Public Spending Controls
29 MPC Process and Transparency
30 Financial Market Volatility
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5.4 Matching Topics and Themes
To follow our aim of producing robust textual analysis results, we must compare outputs
from these various methodologies. Using different software to analyse the same body of
text requires the semantic classification produced by the software to be consistent across
methods. A high proportion of matching topics and themes would imply that our results
are representative of the substantive nature of committee discourse, thus indicating that it
is possible to use specific features of each software to analyse the content of deliberation.
However, a lower matching proportion would suggest that our outputs are more a result of
model choice than input data, potentially undermining the validity of the results.
Matching labels may lead to inaccuracies caused by the sequential nature of labelling,
leaving the results more prone to human biases/errors. At the same time, all three methods
provide lists of characteristic words, and it is these that we compare when matching classes.
While it would be possible to automate the process of matching these lists of characteristic
words, we avoided doing so for two reasons. First, all unsupervised methods will – at
some point – require subjective analysis of the output materials. Hence, automating the
matching process will merely delay the necessary qualitative interpretation (Grimmer and
Stewart 2013). Second, the nature of the output varies widely by software, with T-Lab and
Alceste including lists of the most characteristic ECUs. Interpretation and comparison of
these plain text segments requires an understanding of the underlying nature of deliberative
discourse and hence can be conducted more effectively by the researcher.
In most cases, the qualitative comparison of topics and thematic classes produced by
the various software is intuitive. For example, representative words for class 2 in T-Lab
and class 1 in Alceste include the terms lend, small, bank, size, and enterprise. These are
analogous to words associated with Topic 2 (bank, lend, small, fund). In both cases, the
semantic category produced by the program concerns bank lending to small and medium
size enterprises. Similarly, class 2 in Alceste and class 4 in T-Lab include terms concerning
growth and productivity (growth, product, income), which correspond to words clustered in
Topic 1 (growth, economy, product). This semantic cluster relates to discussions about the
real economy and productivity. For the cases in which a correspondence is not immediately
clear from the list of characteristic words, we compare the representative ECUs produced
in the Alceste detailed report with the documents most closely associated with each cluster
in both T-Lab and STM. We apply the same procedure for all thematic clusters and topics.
Appendix C reports a detailed overview of the characteristic words used to derive each
label and compare software output. Below we report the labels for classes which exhibit
similar linguistic content across the different software. Specifically, Table 4 matches T-Lab
classes to the Alceste output, and Table 5 matches STM topics to the Alceste output.
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Table 4: Alceste Classes and their Matching T-Lab Classes
Corpus Alceste Label Matching T-Lab Class
TSC MP Bank of England Lending Facilities Bank Lending to SMEs
TSC MP Real Economy, Productivity & Competitiveness Real Economy and House Price Growth
TSC MP Monetary Policy Decisions & Decision Making Process Quantitative Easing Discussions
TSC MP Inflation Forecast & Outlook for Inflation Outlook for Inflation and Inflation Expecta-
tions
TSC MP Forward Guidance & Outlook for Monetary Policy -
TSC FP Tax and Benefits Income Tax Rates
TSC FP Budget Process and Role of Ministers Ministerial/Cabinet Involvement in the Bud-
get Process
TSC FP Budget Leaks -
TSC FP Economic Effects of Budget Bank Lending to SMEs
TSC FP Public Deficit and Debt Fiscal Deficit and Government Debt
TSC FS Bank Capital, Leverage & Lending Capacity -
TSC FS Housing & Household Indebtedness Bank Stress Tests, Mortgage Lending and
House Prices
TSC FS Governance of the Bank of England Bank of England Governance and FPC/MPC
TSC FS Barclays and LIBOR LIBOR
EAC MP Pensions, Savings & Annuities QE and Pension Investment
EAC MP Real Economy & Economic Forecasts Inflation Outlook and the Economy
EAC MP Financial Stability & Macro Prudential Policy Leverage Ratio for Banks
EAC MP Banking & Bank Regulation -
EAC MP Too Big to Fail & Bank Resolution Bank Capital and Lending
EAC MP Stress Testing Banks & Bank Lending -
EAC FP Energy, Energy Prices, Gas & Shale Oil Tax Measures (Notably Energy)
EAC FP Real Economy & Bank Lending -
EAC FP Financial Services & Regulation EU/Financial Services/Regulation
EAC FP Scotland & Regions Scotland
Note: The table matches the labels of the semantic classes produced by Alceste with T-Lab clusters which exhibit a similar
linguistic content. Appendix C reports a detailed overview of the characteristic words produced by the two software.
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Table 5: Alceste Classes and their Matching STM Topics
Corpus Alceste Label Matching STM Topic
TSC MP Bank of England Lending Facilities (2) Bank Lending to SMEs
TSC MP Real Economy, Productivity & Competitiveness (1) Labour Market/Economic Growth
TSC MP Monetary Policy Decisions & Decision Making Process (29) MPC Process and Transparency
TSC MP Inflation Forecast & Outlook for Inflation (6) Path of Expected Inflation
TSC MP Forward Guidance & Outlook for Monetary Policy (6) Path of Expected Inflation
TSC FP Tax and Benefits (27) Fiscal Policy/Tax and Benefits
TSC FP Budget Process and Role of Ministers (4) LIBOR
TSC FP Budget Leaks (14) Accountability to the TSC
TSC FP Economic Effects of Budget (5) Real Economy/Investment
TSC FP Public Deficit and Debt (15) Rebalancing of Debt and Imbalances
TSC FS Bank Capital, Leverage & Lending Capacity (26) (Reform of) Bank Capital
TSC FS Housing & Household Indebtedness (7) Housing Market/New Home Building
TSC FS Governance of the Bank of England (23) Bank of England Governance/Oversight
Committee
TSC FS Barclays and LIBOR (4) LIBOR
EAC MP Pensions, Savings & Annuities (11) Transmission of Policy to the Economy
EAC MP Real Economy & Economic Forecasts (6) Path of Expected Inflation
EAC MP Financial Stability & Macro Prudential Policy (10) FPC/Household Debt
EAC MP Banking & Bank Regulation (26) (Reform of) Bank Capital
EAC MP Too Big to Fail & Bank Resolution (25) (Reform of) Bank Regulation
EAC MP Stress Testing Banks & Bank Lending (17) FPC/Bank Capital and Stress Tests
EAC FP Energy, Energy Prices, Gas & Shale Oil (5) Real Economy/Investment
EAC FP Real Economy & Bank Lending (16) Borrowing Costs/Transmission of Mone-
tary Policy
EAC FP Financial Services & Regulation (12) European Union
EAC FP Scotland & Regions (20) Scotland
Note: The table matches the labels of the semantic classes produced by Alceste with STM topics which exhibit a similar
linguistic content. Appendix C reports a detailed overview of the characteristic words produced by the two software.
17
When matching classes from Alceste and T-Lab, only those from the same corpus can be
compared. For example, a T-Lab class from a financial stability hearing cannot be matched
with an Alceste class from monetary policy, because they originated from different sets of
documents. After comparing characteristic words and lemmas from both programs, the
results of the matchings are displayed in Table 4. We obtain a matching rate of 0.75 (18
out of 24). That is, about 75% of classes identified in Alceste reemerge when the documents
are examined in T-Lab, thereby reinforcing the hypothesis that these semantic structures
reflect the nature of committee dialogue.
Table 5 matches our output from the Structural Topic Model with that from Alceste. A
difference between the classification in STM and Alceste is that some STM topics can be
related to more than one thematic class. This is because STM has been run on the whole
corpus while Alceste has been used on the five hearings separately. Most likely, this does
not relate to differences in software; it rather depends on the different level of aggregation
in the dataset. Supporting this view, general themes (for example, related to the economic
trends etc.) that appear in more than one type of committee hearing tend to be grouped
under a single topic. Some topics are not matched to a thematic class. Again, this is likely
due to the different corpora used. A further reason is the different parameters applied to
STM - the higher number of topics (30) used with respect to about to a total 24 thematic
classes across all five corpora. In order to reconcile the five hearings Alceste classification
with the combined hearings STM classification, we specify a 25 class thematic analysis in
Appendix C. The reason we do not use this is because a pre-requisite of thematic software
is the existence of a unifying conceptual discourse – mixing hearings across chambers and
across policy types violates this prerequisite.
An additional difference between the thematic software and the STM algorithm is that
the latter identifies derives a series of ‘discussion topics’ which exhibit high probability on
terms such as ‘ask’ or ‘yes’ (for example, topic 3 in Table 3), and as a consequence, are
of little substantive interest. Typically themes consisting predominantly of non-substantive
discussion words are absent or less prevalent in thematic software, since the number of
obtained classes is smaller.11 However, when the discourse under investigation contains
a large share of unique contextual language – e.g. parliamentary/legislative committee
rhetoric – this can appear as a unique theme (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006).
Despite these differences, we are able to recover about 70% of the classes produced in
Alceste from the topic model.12 This suggests a high degree of consistency in the thematic
classification produced in the three cases, which we can use to study topic/class prevalence
in the the corpus.
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6 Topic/Class Prevalences
To gain a more in-depth understanding of committee dialogue, we can examine the rela-
tionships between clusters and tagged covariates. The ways in which thematic software and
structural topic models study cluster prevalence are distinct yet complementary. Alceste
and T-Lab model these relationships spatially, using a correspondence analysis. On the
other hand, STM calculates the statistical uncertainty associated with covariate effects on
latent topics, presenting the results as either point estimations, or difference estimations if
the covariate is binary. We suggest that, by integrating these two approaches, it is possible
to investigate the nature of committee policy discourse along multiple dimensions of interest.
We proceed as follows. First, we use correspondence analysis to study the sequential and
interactive nature of deliberation across various hearings, specifically with respect to reci-
procity. We then use specific features of STM to investigate the differences and similarities
across different committees that emerge in the correspondence analysis, in particular with
respect to the role of partisanship in shaping the content of the debate. As with section
5, the similar and independent methods employed by the different programs provide the
opportunity to assess the robustness of our results, and build upon them.
6.1 Correspondence Analysis
A correspondence analysis estimates the spatial relationships between classes and tagged co-
variates. As a type of factorial analysis, it extracts factors with the property of summarising
significant information. Each factor can be interpreted as a spatial dimension that is rep-
resented by an axis whose centre is the value “0”, and diverges towards both extremes, so
that tagged covariates (tags) on opposite poles are the most weakly associated. As such, the
positions of the tags is contingent on associations rather than coordinates, with the distance
reflecting the degree of co-occurrence. The first factor aims to account for the maximum
variation, and the second factor aims to account for the maximum of remaining variation,
and so on. Hence, the total variation is divided into components along principal axes. In
general, the dimensionality of the system is one less than the number of identified classes in
the profile, see Greenacre (2017). The correspondence analysis provides a framework for the
researcher to formulate her interpretation, rather than providing unambiguous conclusions.
An individual two dimensional representation of a correspondence analysis has been
produced for each of the five corpora. For the first corpus (TSC Monetary Policy), we
replicate the full analysis conducted in Schonhardt-Bailey (2015). The key findings are then
summarised for the remaining four corpora.
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Figure 1: Correspondence Analysis for TSC Monetary Policy
Class 1 Bank of England Lending Facilities
Class 2 Real Economy, Productivity & Competitiveness
Class 3 Monetary Policy Decisions & Decision Making Process
Class 4 Inflation Forecast & Outlook for Inflation
Class 5 Forward Guidance & Outlook for Monetary Policy
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Within the context of a correspondence graph, we expect to uncover evidence of reci-
procity (or the lack thereof). Specifically, when the labels representing members of the
committee and witnesses who are being held to account are near to one another, this sug-
gests they are emphasising the same underlying semantic structures in similar proportions.
We expect this to occur if those being held to account are addressing the concerns of the
committee directly, rather than shifting the frame of dialogue.
Figure 1 shows a two-dimensional representation of the correspondence analysis for the
Treasury Select Committee’s monetary policy hearings. In this case, the two factors plotted
account for 66.4% of the total variation. We observe a close proximity of both MPC and
TSC members to four of the five classes. The one exception is class 3 - Monetary Policy
Decisions & Decision Making Process - where only Chairman Tyrie one other MP (Ruﬄey)
form the cluster surrounding this theme. Moreover, the close proximity of both the Con-
servative and Labour party tags to the class 3 tag indicates a strong cross-party consensus
on the importance of challenging the Bank on its institutional decision making process and
governance. In short, with the exception of this class, the TSC’s monetary policy hearings
exhibit a reciprocal dialogue between legislators and experts (that is, around each theme,
members of both the MPC and TSC converge, meaning that both engage in the thematic
dialogue (Schonhardt-Bailey 2015)).
There are two further noteworthy observations. First, the horizontal factor appears to
delineate between two types of oversight. In the left quadrants, the real economy, inflation
forecast and forward guidance all pertain to economic policy, whereas the right quadrants
focus on issues of accountability and governance. Second, there is a large disparity between
the two Bank of England governors - Mervyn King (until 2012) and Mark Carney (2013
onwards). King’s tag is nearer to class 1 and Carney closer to classes 2, 4 and 5. This is a
direct result of changes in the Bank’s activities post-financial crisis - there is a movement
from overseeing the conduct of new schemes like Funding for Lending (introduced during
the crisis) towards forward guidance.
An equivalent to Figure 1 is created for each of the remaining four hearing types, but
these are not shown here (these are fully reported Schonhardt-Bailey (2015)). For the TSC’s
fiscal policy hearings, the cumulative variation captured in a two-dimensional graph is lower
at 57%, and thus the spatial representation may be less substantively robust. Nonetheless,
we observe a positioning of Chancellor George Osborne and Chief Secretary of the Treasury
Danny Alexander in roughly the centre of the spatial graph (0,0), though slightly nearer to
class 5 - Public Deficit and Debt. Fiscal policy oversight entails a “one vs. many”, where
a single treasury official is standing alone against the committee. This means that the
opportunity for the fiscal policy witnesses to be situated in proximity to multiple classes is
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impossible. We also find a clear partisan split, with the Conservatives focussing on budget
leaks and Labour in close proximity to the Tax and Benefits class.
Moving on to the TSC financial stability hearings, we observe a lower degree of reci-
procity with classes 2 and 3 experiencing clusterings of both FPC and TSC members, but
class 1 (Bank Capital, Leverage, & Lending Capacity) is predominantly the remit of BoE
internal FPC members (Bailey, Haldane and Fisher). Discourse surrounding the LIBOR
fixing scandal and the resignation of Barclay’s CEO Bob Diamond is in close proximity to
Chairman Tyrie and other TSC members. It may be the case that TSC members exhibit
greater interest in those areas with a high media focus.
The correspondence graph for EAC’s monetary policy hearings13 exhibits a close overlap
in word co-occurrence between classes 5 and 6 (Too Big to Fail & Bank Resolution, and Stress
Testing Banks & Bank Lending) respectively. As a result, the focal points for these classes
can not be statistically confirmed and are therefore not plotted. In general, we observe a low
degree of reciprocity in fiscal policy hearings and a higher degree of reciprocity in monetary
policy hearings.
6.2 STM analysis
An important feature of STM is the possibility to test statistically hypotheses concerning
the relationships between specific variables and topical prevalence.14 In what follows, we
shall test topic prevalence along two policy dimensions which have emerged from the analysis
above, namely the effect of partisanship, and differences between the House of Commons
and the House of Lords. These results both reinforce conclusions from the correspondence
analysis above, and in themselves uncover further insights.
6.2.1 Partisanship
The theoretical discussion in Sections 2 and 3 suggests that deliberative accountability, to be
effective, requires cross-party exchange of views and arguments. Yet, in our correspondence
analyses (section 6.1), we find evidence of variations in the position of party labels. For
example, in the TSC’s fiscal policy hearings the Conservatives focussed on budget leaks,
whereas Labour was in close proximity to the “Tax and Benefits” class. The STM allows
us to assess the degree of statistical uncertainty associated with these observations.
We start by analysing the impact of partisanship on discussions related to fiscal policy.
Figure 2 reports point estimates for topic proportions related to fiscal issues, using their
labels from Table 3. Here, “no party” signifies Bank of England officials, “government”
signifies Government ministers (primarily Chancellor George Osborne in Fiscal policy hear-
ings). Crossbencher refers to non-partisan peers in the Lords’ committee. These estimates
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are equivalent to the conditional probability of observing a particular topic in the text given
the party affiliation of the speaker; the figure reports 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2: By-party Topic Proportions for Fiscal Policy
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
Topic 13: Policy discussion
Crossbencher
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Labour
LibDem
Conservative
No Party
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
Topic 15: Rebalancing of Debt and Imbalances
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
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Crossbencher
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SNP
Labour
LibDem
Conservative
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0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
Topic 28: Public spending controls
Using this metric, divisions along partisan lines are clear. Speakers from the Labour
Party exhibit a significantly higher probability of engaging with topics related to the dis-
tributive issues (topic 24) than those from other parties. At the same time, speakers from
the Government (again primarily the Chancellor) exhibit a greater proportion of attention
to deficit and debt (Topic 15). The latter is consistent with the finding in section 6.1 that
the Government’s discourse is evenly distributed across most classes, but is slightly pulled
towards class 5 - Public Deficit and Debt. In addition, the results in Figure 2 suggest the
existence of an ideological divide. Labour Party members engage more frequently with re-
distributive aspects of the budget while members of the Conservative-Liberal Democratic
Government talk more frequently about implications for debt and deficits. This finding, not
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immediately evident using the correspondence analysis method discussed above, is consis-
tent with existing accounts of party ideological positioning on economic policy (Laver and
Garry 2000, Laver et al. 2003). It suggests that, in contested areas such as fiscal policy,
partisanship exerts a significant role in shaping the content of deliberation.
Figure 3: By-party Topic Proportions for Non-politicised Policy Areas
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Topic 1: Real Economy & Productivity
Crossbencher
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SNP
Labour
LibDem
Conservative
No Party
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Topic 21: Monetary Policy Decisions
To further understand this partisan divide, we should consider cases where the party
narrative is less prominent. As an example, Figure 3 reports the point estimates of topic
prevalences across parties for discussions related to the real economy (topic 1) and con-
cerning the analysis of monetary policy decisions (topic 21). As expected, in these cases
the partisan divide is less evident. This is particularly true for speakers from the Labour
and the Conservative parties, who instead exhibit large differences in topic proportions for
fiscal topics (Figure 2 above). These considerations suggest a partisan divide in deliberation
emerges more clearly in the case of fiscal policy oversight (politically more contested) as
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opposed to monetary policy, where a broad cross-party consensus on the fundamentals of
policy appears to exist.
In particular, when discussing fiscal policy, speakers from different parties seem to sys-
tematically engage with different topics. This arguably limits the scope for genuine deliber-
ation in this particular policy area, something which is also reflected in the low percentage
of cumulative variation captured by the correspondence analysis of TSC hearings on fiscal
policy (see Section 6.1). The analysis carried out in this section allows relating the absence
of reciprocity uncovered in the correspondence analysis of TSC hearings directly to a par-
tisan divide. The pattern of arguments used by actors involved in fiscal oversight appears
to follow their political affiliations rather than constituting a reciprocal exchange of views,
therefore suggesting more of a ‘notice posting’ form of discourse rather than genuine delib-
eration. Finally, an important finding is that such partisan effect is absent in the context
of monetary policy hearings, which suggests that the political salience and level of technical
sophistication of the policy area discussed has some effects on the content of the debate.
The next section investigates the latter point in greater detail by focusing on differences in
deliberation between the House of Commons and he House of Lords.
6.2.2 Chamber Affiliation
An equivalent question can be posed regarding the effect of chamber affiliation (Commons
for TSC, and Lords for EAC) on topic proportions. To test this, Figure 4 reports point
estimates of STM topic proportions for each committee for topics related to oversight of the
Bank of England.
In line with our Alceste findings, the figure shows that TSC hearings exhibit a higher
topical prevalence on topic 29 (MPC decision-making process). This is not true only for TSC
hearings on monetary policy but also for those on financial stability. At the same time, these
results indicate no statistical difference between TSC and EAC on other aspects of monetary
decisions. Hence they confirm the idea that TSC committee members are comparatively
more focussed on discussing the internal decision making processes of the Bank of England
(e.g. for the MPC this included its transparency).
To further investigate the effect of chamber affiliation on dialogue, Figure 5 shows the
estimated differences between topics addressed in the House of Commons and the House of
Lords, for the full set of (non-discussion) topics identified by the model. Note that differently
from the point estimates presented in Figures 2-4, Figure 5 reports the expected difference
in topic proportions for EAC hearings as compared to TSC, with those to the right of 0
being more prevalent in the Lords and those to the left more prevalent in the Commons. In
this case, estimates are obtained by controlling for both party affiliations and the type of
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Figure 4: By-committee topic proportions for monetary policy
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policy hearing.
In line with the idea that deliberation in the EAC reflects the experience and exper-
tise of committee members, we see a positive and significant difference for a number of
technical topics including for example topic 5 (Real Economy/Investment), 12 (European
Union) and 26 ((Reform of) Bank Regulation). Overall we find a significant amount of
correlation between the correspondence analysis for Alceste, and our point estimations from
the STM. Furthermore, the STM provides further insights through the visualisation of the
statistical uncertainty associated with estimates of topic proportions across covariates of
interest. Interestingly, the Lords is more strongly associated with both 25 ((Reform of)
Bank Resolution) and 26 ((Reform of) Bank Capital) than the TSC despite not having a
dedicated financial stability oversight committee hearing. This suggests that EAC hearings
are discussing financial stability alongside their statutory objectives.
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Figure 5: Differences in topic proportions by Chamber
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7 Conclusion
We have sought two goals in this paper–one substantive and one methodological. Our
substantive goal sought to explore variations in the setting of oversight committees (across
economic policy and across parliamentary chamber) in order to gauge deliberative quality.
We employed two indicators to measure the quality of deliberation–reciprocal dialogue and
non- (or cross-) partisanship. We contended that reciprocity and non-partisanship might
vary according to who and what is being held to account. For instance, to what extent
does partisanship shape oversight hearings on fiscal policy relative to monetary policy and
financial stability? In the case of the former, backbench parliamentarians are holding front-
bench parliamentarians to account; in the latter, parliamentarians are holding unelected
policy experts to account. Does the nature of the deliberative process systematically vary
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according to these differences? Moreover, we explored the extent to which the institutional
context for oversight hearings (that is, House of Commons versus House of Lords) matters
for deliberation. Both chambers have select committees that oversee economic policy, even
though the TSC is the primary oversight committee (the Commons’ TSC has the statutory
responsibility for conducting oversight, although the Lords’ EAC nonetheless conducts its
own investigations into various aspects of economic policy). Our question here is, does
deliberation in the (elected) committee of MPs differ from deliberation occurring in the
(unelected) committee of peers?
Thematic and topic model textual analysis approaches are consistent in the following
findings. First, fiscal policy hearings are clearly distinct in their partisan content. How-
ever, each textual analysis approach captures a different dimension of this partisan story.
Thematic software finds virtually no partisan cleavage between the two main parties (Con-
servative / Labour) in monetary policy, but in fiscal policy, MPs of the minority party
(Labour) tend to have a greater say in questioning the Conservative chancellor. The corre-
spondence analysis in thematic software also captures the impact of this partisanship on the
deliberative process. That is, hearings with Bank officials tend to exhibit greater reciprocity
in deliberation, whereas those on fiscal policy exhibit more of a “talking across” one another
phenomenon. In monetary policy, MPs and peers tend to converge with MPC members on
each theme (with the exception of the theme of monetary policy decision making, where
Chairman Tyrie was more singularly focused). In fiscal policy, the Chancellor tends to speak
to one theme, while committee members focus on other themes.
The STM analysis adds to the partisan story the ability to gauge point estimates for
topic proportions across different topics, and so allows us to observe that Labour Party
committee members have a significantly higher probability of engaging with topics related
to distributive issues that members from the other parties. And, witnesses from the Gov-
ernment (namely, Chancellor Osborne) exhibit a greater proportion of attention to the topic
of the deficit and debt.
We also explore differences between the Commons’ committee and the Lords’ commit-
tee. From the thematic software (particularly evident in the correspondence analysis), we
saw that the TSC was uniquely focused on issues of the institutional governance of the
Bank of England and the process of decision making within the MPC (e.g., transparency),
whereas the EAC appeared to divide attention among a number of lesser related topics
(e.g., Scotland, energy policy). From the STM, we could explore the array of topics for each
committee, across all the policy hearings. From Figure 5, we could observe the expected
difference in the topic proportions for the EAC relative to the TSC. Here, the differences
became more prominent–e.g., for the EAC, reforming bank resolution and bank capital,
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Scotland, and the EU were particularly distinctive topics; while for the TSC, the areas of
predominant focus included fiscal outlook, tax and benefits, housing, the labour market,
Bank of England governance, and the process of MPC decision making.
Our second broad goal in this paper is methodological. We have maintained that by
conducting multiple automated content analyses on the same corpus, we can provide a
more comprehensive empirical assessment of our two indicators of deliberative quality in
oversight hearings. Using the correspondence analysis in the thematic software, we are
able to capture visually the extent to which committee members and witnesses talk “to” as
opposed to “across” one another. A thematic approach also captures part of the partisan
cleavages across economic policy, but the STM approach extends the partisan story by
providing point estimates for topic proportions across different topics, thus allowing us to
better compare probabilities across topics and parties.
In sum, we have drawn on both thematic and topic modelling approaches to broaden
our understanding of deliberation in parliamentary oversight committee hearings. We have
found that the content (in themes and topics) is broadly similar for both approaches (roughly
70% in a direct comparison between one of the thematic packages and the STM approach).
Having a solid common understanding of the content of the hearings, we have then exploited
aspects of each software to assess indicators of deliberative quality. In the end, we have found
the two approaches to be complementary. Indeed, by employing multiple textual analysis
approaches, we deepen our understanding of both the underlying content of the corpora,
but we also allow for a broader methodological toolkit. From the thematic analysis, we
better understand the potential for reciprocal discussions within a group setting (which is a
key concern for deliberative democracy), while from the STM, we can generate both point
estimates and differences in topic proportions. Arguably, our use of multiple textual analysis
software lessens the elegance of the analysis as one is forced to explain a much broader
array of methodologies; however, our simple point is that thematic and topic approaches
complement rather than conflict with one another.
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Notes
1A rotation of members of the Monetary Policy Committee testify on the Inflation Report. The MPC
consists of both internal and external members, with the former comprised of the Governor, two Deputy
Governors, the Executive Director for Markets and the Chief Economist. There are four external members
and apart from their position on the MPC these individuals hold no other position at the BoE. MPC
members rotate before the TSC, but the delegation almost always includes the Governor.
2The process followed by each specific software is explained in more detail below.
3See e.g., Quinn et al. (2010)
4The Bank of England publishes the Inflation Report quarterly (February, May, August and November).
The Treasury Select Committee does not necessarily hold hearings on each of the reports.
5The Bank of England publishes the Financial Stability Report semi-annually (July, December). This
study includes the hearings on these reports from their statutory origin in 2013
6Financial Stability hearings began in the TSC with the “interim FPC” in 2012. Following the passage
of financial services legislation in 2013, the Financial Stability Committee formally came into existence.
7T-Lab provides the researcher some freedom to specify the number of clusters formed during the clas-
sification. To guarantee a simple and direct comparison with Alceste, we set the number of classes in the
classification of each corpus to be the same as the number derived in Alceste.
8The held out likelihood indicates the extent to which a particular model, trained on a subset of words,
can be used to predict the probability of the remaining terms. See Appendix B for more explanations.
9See Appendix B.
10Results remain very similar changing slightly the number of topics.
11One feature of T-Lab is that the number of classes can be set by the user, similarly as in topic modelling.
When the number of classes in T-Lab is set at 25 (chosen because this is equivalent to the number of non-
discussion STM topics) for the combined set of documents used in this paper, for instance, a discussion
topic does emerge (class 17 in Appendix D).
12Once again, the reader can refer to Appendix C for a detailed overview of the comparison process
between the two software.
13When conducting the thematic clustering of EAC fiscal policy hearings in Alceste, instead, the classifica-
tion rate for ECUs was only 46%, a particularly low value. Given its classification rate, the correspondence
graph could not be produced.
14Existing topic model implementations (including STM) do not allow for visualising patterns of associa-
tion between relevant covariates and clusters through correspondence analysis.
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A List of Hearings
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee:
Monetary Policy Hearings:
28 July 2010, Inflation Report
10 November 2010, Inflation Report
1 March 2011, Inflation Report
28 June 2011, Inflation Report
25 October 2011 [Quantitative Easing]
28 November 2011, Inflation Report
29 February 2012, Inflation Report
26 June 2012, Inflation Report
27 November 2012, Inflation Report
25 June 2013, Inflation Report
12 September 2013, Inflation Report
26 November 2013, Inflation Report
24 June 2014, Inflation Report
10 September 2014, Inflation Report
25 November 2014, Inflation Report
24 February 2015, Inflation Report
Fiscal Policy Hearings:
15 July 2010 [Budget]
4 November 2010 [Spending Round]
29 March 2011 [Budget]
27 March 2012 [Budget]
26 March 2013 [Budget]
11 July 2013 [Spending Round]
17 December 2014 Autumn Statement
Financial Stability Reports and Hearings 2011-2015
17 January 2012: (December 2011 FSR)
17 July 2012: (June 2012 FSR)
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15 January 2013: (November 2012 FSR)
2 July 2013: (June 2013 FSR)
15 January 2014: (November 2013 FSR)
15 July 2014: (June 2014 FSR)
14 January 2015: (December 2014 FSR)
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee:
Monetary Policy Hearings:
16 November 2010: Meeting with the Governor
27 March 2012: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Governor and MPC members)
17 December 2013: Meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England
10 March 2015: Meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England
Fiscal Policy Hearings:
30 November 2010: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Chancellor and Treasury Staff)
8 December 2011: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Chancellor and Treasury Staff)
4 February 2014: Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer
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B Model selection in STM
With respect to fitting the algorithm to the corpus, two features of STM should be noted.
First, the user must define the number of topics, K, prior to the analysis. In this case, we
opt for a model with K=30 topics after exploring the performances for alternative specifi-
cations ranging from 25 to 40 topics. Such topic range was suggested by exploring model
performance for the held-out likelihood, a commonly used metric of model fit for topic model
(Wallach et al. 2009), for the dataset of interest. Furthermore, as mentioned a key feature
of STM is the possibility of comparing topic prevalence across hearings. For this reason, we
fit the algorithm to the a dataset comprising the five hearings combined.
The held-out likelihood is the probability that a given model correctly predicts a set of
words intentionally left out from the estimation, namely the estimation of words probability
after some of those words have been removed from the text. The essence of this method
is to check which model gives the best out-of-sample predictions, i.e. it is able to better
explain the left-out set of words.
The held-out likelihood for a sequence of K = 5, 10, 15 ... 80 topics is reported in
Figure 6. The Figure shows that the held-out likelihood is low for models with less than 20
topics, it remains broadly stable for K between 20 to 40 topics, and it marginally increases
afterwards. While Figure 6 suggests a model with 80 topics would provide the best model
fit among those considered, increasing the number of topics to 80 would probably imply loss
of generality for the interpretation, as topics become over-identified (Gru¨n and Hornik 2011,
pg. 13). In general, interpretability is also an important criterion for choosing the number
of topics (Blei 2012).
Taking these considerations into account, we opt for a model using a spectral initialisation
(Roberts, Stewart and Tingley 2014) with K=30 topics after exploring the performances for
alternative specifications ranging from 25 to 40 topics (the shaded grey area in Figure 6).
Figure 6 suggests models in this range provide a reasonable fit of the text; at the same
time, the limited number of topics should allow direct comparison with the semantic classes
derived in Alceste and T-Lab.
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Figure 6: Held-out Likelihood for K = 5, 10, ..., 80
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C Matching Software Outputs
Alceste and Structural Topic Model:
TSC Monetary Policy:
Alceste class 1: lend, small, bank, size, enterprise
Topic 2: bank lend small fund credit compani busi
Alceste label: Bank of England Lending Facilities
STM: Bank Lending to SMEs
Alceste class 2: growth econom income product
Topic 1: growth economi product recoveri see unemploy data pick labourmarket
Alceste label: Real Economy, Productivity & Competitiveness
STM: Labour Market/Economic Growth
Alceste class 3: monetary polic; committee, discuss, decision
Topic 29: view discuss decis committe differ meet whether member monetarypolicycommitte
Alceste Label: Monetary Policy Decisions & Decision Making Process
STM label: MPC Process and Transparency
Alceste class 4: inflation forecast target look expect
Topic 6: inflat percent expect target forecast look mediumterm rise forwardguid will guidanc
Alceste Label: Inflation Forecast, Expectations & Outlook for Inflation
STM label: Path of Expected Inflation
Alceste class 5: guidance, interest rate, threshold, tighten, forward guidan
Topic 6: inflat percent expect target forecast look mediumterm rise forwardguid guidanc
Alceste Label: Forward Guidance & Outlook for Monetary Policy
STM label: Path of Expected Inflation
TSC Fiscal Policy:
Alceste class 1: tax income benefit people percent system
Topic 27: tax percent peopl increas pound cut work measur benefit take fair system incom
Alceste Label: Housing & Household Indebtedness
STM label: Fiscal Policy / Tax and Benefits
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Alceste class 2: department, cabinet contract ring process secretary minister
Topic 4: process minist involv consult secretari treasuri prime chief offici part
Alceste Label: Budget Process and Role of Ministers
STM label: LIBOR
Alceste class 3: committee chancellor brief office for budg budget inform
Topic 14: committe think made interest public good inform
Alceste Label: Budget Leaks
STM label: Accountability to the TSC
Alceste class 4: small sector businesses private bank fund regional
Topic 5: invest job busi project privatesector will new industri creat region
Alceste Label: Economic Effects of Budget
STM label: Real Economy/Investment
Alceste class 5: deficit, structural, fiscal budget deficit, fiscal, world
Topic 15: economi countri debt econom deficit problem export challeng growth world
Alceste Label: Public Deficit and Debt
STM label: Rebalancing of Debt and Imbalances
TSC Financial Stability:
Alceste class 1: capital bank asset ratio sheet institution
Topic 26: bank capit liquid balancesheet account asset fsa crisi posit hold
Alceste Label: Bank Capital, Leverage, & Lending Capacity
STM label: (Reform of) Bank Capital
Alceste class 2: price, market, econom, debt mortgage rate interest rates rise income
Topic 7: scheme hous will new home mortgag suppli housepric build increas
Alceste Label: Housing & Household Indebtedness
STM label: Housing Market/New Home Building
Alceste class 3: committee court board decision oversight chancellor parliament report
Topic 23: report suggest evid review respons independ court board oversightcommitte
Alceste Label: Governance of the Bank of England
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STM label: Bank of England Governance/Oversight Committee
Alceste class 4: ask governor thank answer andrew subject helpful conference new york fed
Topic 4: libor cabinet perman depart discuss contract situat bba work
Alceste Label: Barclays and LIBOR
STM label: LIBOR
EAC Monetary Policy:
Alceste class 1: assets asset purchas gilt yield pension purchase private
Topic 11: interestr, mean, therefor, might, effect, pension, rise, obvious, suppos
Alceste Label: Pensions, Savings & Annuities
STM label: Transmission of Policy to the Economy
Alceste class 2: inflation growth percent interest rate price consistent
Topic 6: inflat percent expect target forecast look mediumterm
Alceste Label: Real Economy & Economic Forecast
STM label: Path of Expected Inflation
Alceste class 3: prudent financial policy prudential regu supervis prudential regu finan-
cial servic financial stabili
Topic 10: risk financialst take financialpolicycommitte tool perspect mortgag type potenti
term fpc debt respons valu action stabil
Alceste Label: Financial Stability & Macro Prudential Policy
STM label: FPC/Household Debt
Alceste class 4: want political auditors competitivenes reform politic
Topic 26: air system incom analysi impact make includ chang welfar way
Alceste Label: Banking & Bank Regulation
STM label: (Reform of) Bank Capital
Alceste class 5: fail buffer big institut border trouble bail systemically taxpayer
Topic 25: bank regul problem fail issu structur big competit new way import system rule
Alceste Label: Too Big to Fail & Bank Resolution
STM label: (Reform of) Bank Regulation
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Alceste class 6: test ring fence stress standard resilient individual capitalised
?Topic 17: fpc power set institut need leverageratio capit system stresstest will bank
Alceste Label: Stress Testing Banks & Bank Lending
STM label: FPC/Bank Capital and Stress Tests
EAC Fiscal Policy:
Alceste class 1: gas regime shale local oil region energy
Topic 5: region particular peopl support area price part help publicsector countri oil
Alceste Label: Energy, Energy Prices, Gas & Shale Oil
STM label: Real Economy/Investment
Alceste class 2: percent medium small credit enterprise
Topic 16: rate cost peopl pay borrow high look
Alceste Label: Real Economy & Bank Lending
STM label: Borrowing Costs/Transmission of Monetary Policy
Alceste class 3: financial regul service european unio bank prudent legislat centre proper
Topic 12: nation countri control requir european will london british legisl europeanunion
Alceste Label: Financial Services & Regulation
STM label: European Union
Alceste class 4: scotland scottish establish arrangement fiscal
Topic 20: unit state kingdom reserv scotland global relat gdp
Alceste Label: Scotland & Regions
STM label: Scotland
Alceste and T-Lab:
TSC Monetary Policy:
Alceste class 1: lend, small, bank, size, enterprise
T-Lab class 2: bank lend small enterprise medium-sized fund
Alceste label: Bank of England Lending Facilities
T-Lab label: Bank Lending to SMEs
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Alceste class 2: growth econom income product
T-Lab class 4: growth price interest rates house income consumption
Alceste label: Real Economy, Productivity & Competitiveness
T-Lab label: Real Economy and House Price Growth
Alceste class 3: monetary polic committee discuss decision
T-Lab class 5: gilt quantitatice easing monetary policy committee asset
Alceste Label: Monetary Policy Decisions & Decision Making Process
T-Lab label: Quantitative Easing Discussions
Alceste class 4: inflation forecast target look expect
T-Lab class 1: inflation percent forecast labour target expectation
Alceste Label: Inflation Forecast, Expectations & Outlook for Inflation
T-Lab label: Outlook fro Inflation and Inflation Expectations
Alceste class 5: guidance, interest rate, threshold, tighten, forward guidan
UNMATCHED
TSC Fiscal Policy:
Alceste class 1: tax income benefit people percent system
T-Lab class 4: tax rate pounds income billion increase measure oil
Alceste Label: Housing & Household Indebtedness
T-Lab label: Income Tax Rates
Alceste class 2: department, cabinet contract ring process secretary minister
T-Lab class 3: department process minister secretary contract prime chief
Alceste Label: Budget Process and Role of Ministers
T-Lab label: Ministerial/Cabinet Involvement in the Budget Process
Alceste class 3: committee chancellor brief office for budg budget inform
UNMATCHED
Alceste class 4: small sector businesses private bank fund regional
T-Lab class 5: bank banks committee small business lend
Alceste Label: Economic Effects of Budget
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T-Lab Label: Bank Lending to SMEs
Alceste class 5: deficit, structural, fiscal budget deficit, fiscal, world
T-Lab class 2: economy debt deficit economic country fiscal structural UK
Alceste Label: Public Deficit and Debt
T-Lab label: Fiscal Deficit and Government Debt
TSC Financial Stability:
Alceste class 1: capital bank asset ratio sheet institution
UNMATCHED
Alceste class 2: price, market, econom, debt mortgage rate interest rates rise income
T-Lab class 1: risk lend mortgage price house capital UK asset economy debt
Alceste Label: Housing & Household Indebtedness
T-Lab label: Bank Stress Tests, Mortgage Lending and House Prices
Alceste class 3: committee court board decision oversight chancellor parliament report
T-Lab class 2: Committee oversight member M P C decision court view
Alceste Label: Governance of the Bank of England
T-Lab label: Bank of England Governance and FPC/MPC
Alceste class 4: ask governor thank answer andrew subject helpful conference new york fed
T-Lab class 3: L I B O R B B A barclays evidence consultation week dark
Alceste Label: Barclays and LIBOR
T-Lab label: LIBOR
EAC Monetary Policy:
Alceste class 1: assets asset purchas gilt yield pension purchase private
T-Lab class 5: asset pension gilt yield annuity purchase buy Q E
Alceste Label: Pensions, Savings & Annuities
T-Lab label: QE and Pension Investment
Alceste class 2: inflation growth percent interest rate price consistent
T-Lab class 1: inflation growth economy target percent productivity expectation price
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Alceste Label: Real Economy & Economic Forecasts
T-Lab label: Inflation Outlook and the Economy
Alceste class 3: prudent financial policy prudential regu supervis prudential regu finan-
cial servic financial stabili
T-Lab class 4: leverage institution ratio system regulation prudential supervision Basel Al-
ceste Label: Financial Stability & Macro Prudential Policy
T-Lab label: Leverage Ratio for Banks
Alceste class 4: want political auditors competitivenes reform politic
UNMATCHED
Alceste class 5: fail buffer big institut border trouble bail systemically taxpayer
T-Lab class 2: banks capital banking system debt requirement Irish global lend
Alceste Label: Too Big to Fail & Bank Resolution
T-Lab label: Bank Capital and Lending
Alceste class 6: test ring fence stress standard resilient individual capitalised
UNMATCHED
EAC Fiscal Policy:
Alceste class 1: gas regime shale local oil region energy
T-Lab class 1: tax impact carbon spend decade benefit local rate pricel
Alceste Label: Energy, Energy Prices, Gas & Shale Oil
T-Lab label: Tax Measures (notably energy)
Alceste class 2: percent medium small credit enterprise
UNMATCHED
Alceste class 3: financial regul service european unio bank prudent legislat centre proper
T-Lab class 3: financial bank service Vickers sector banks regulation ask regulator
Alceste Label: Financial Services & Regulation
T-Lab label: EU/Financial Services/Regulation
Alceste class 4: scotland scottish establish arrangement fiscal
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T-Lab class 4: fiscal union scotland vote monetary political scottish bad
Alceste Label: Scotland & Regions
T-Lab label: Scotland
46
D 25-class T-Lab Clustering
Table 6: Characteristic Words and Labels for a 25-Class Thematic Analysis
Characteristic Words Label
1 labour capacity spare market gap Spare Capacity and Labour Markets
2 benefit housing House child claim Unemployment and Housing Benefits
3 banks scheme lend fund incentive Lending and Bank Lending Scheme
4 F P C power P R A board recommendation FPC/PRA
5 inflation target percent remit expectation Inflation Targeting and Expectations
6 billion plan pounds spend set out Public Speding and Budget
7 union monetary arrangement currency euro EMU and Fiscal Integration
8 yield gilt asset purchases Q E unwind Quantitative Easing
9 treasury official secretary minister press Treasury Department and Officials
10 economy export rebalancing consumption recovery International Trade and Demand
11 reserves deposit hong G D P kong Foreign Currency Reserves
12 unite united rest kingdom solution United Kingdom
13 bond assets buy corporate purchase Asset Purchasing
14 institution regulation capital leverage requirement Leverage Ratios/Capital Requirements
15 interest rates raise rate long-term low Interest Rateqs
16 tax budget chancellor YR MARCH12 penny Taxation (particularly income tax)
17 question answer ask quick R CHAIR Questioning (disc.)
18 issue service governor majority financial Finance and Scottish Independance
19 price risk inflation energy commodity Price Changes and Inflation
20 growth productivity wage average data Productivity and Wage Growth
21 public expenditure deficit decision political Public Expenditure and the Defecit
22 home build local social building Housing Policy
23 contingency event okay have– but– Bank of England Contingency Planning
24 monetary policy guidance tighten stance Path of Monetary Policy/Forward Guidance
25 small enterprise business medium-sized company SMEs
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